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ABSTRACT
A century ago there occurred a peak ofinterest in dissociation and the
dissociative disorders, then labeled hysteria. The most important
scientific and clinical investigator of this subject was PierreJanet
(1859-1947), whose early body of work is reviewed here. The
evolution of his dissociation theory and its major principles are
traced throughout his writings. Janet's introduction of the term
"subconscious" and his concept of the existence of consciousness
outside ofpersonal awareness are explained. The viability and rele-
vance ofdissociation as the underlyingphenomenon in a wide range
oj disorders is presented. It is proposed that Janet's theory and
methodology ofpsychological analysis and dynamic psychotherapy
are cogent and relevant for today's students and practitioners.
INTRODUCTION
Acenturyago,PierreJanet (1859-1947) became France's
most important student of dissociation and hysteria. At that
time, hysteria included a broad range of disorders now
categorized in the DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, 1987) as dissociative, somatization, conversion, border-
line personality, and post-traumatic stress disorders. Through
extensive study, observation and experiments using hypno-
sis in the treatment of hysteria, Janet discovered that disso-
ciation was the underlying characteristic mechanism pres-
ent in each of these disorders.
Unfortunately, his view of the importance of dissocia-
tion in hysteria and its treatment were abandoned when
hypnosis fell into disrepute. This retreat from hypnosis at the
end of the nineteenth century coincided with the publica-
tion and popularity of Freud's early psychoanalytic studies.
Historically,Janet's considerable body ofworkwas neglected
in favor of the rising popularity and acceptance of Freud's
psychoanalytical observations and conceptualizations.
Today, renewed clinical and scientific interest in disso-
ciation and the dissociative disorders calls for reexamining
the experimental, clinical, and theoretical observations made
in psychiatry during the past century. While many psycho-
analytically-oriented clinicians restrict their historical inter-
est to the study of Breuer and Freud (1895), others have
searched for the original sources in French psychiatry,
especially those of Pierre Janet. Their efforts have been
hampered by the difficulty ofobtaining the original publica-
tions in French, and by the scarcity of these works translated
in English translation.
In recent years a change has taken place with regard to
Janet. The Societe Pierre Janet in France has been reprint-
ing his books since 1973. In the English-speaking world a
small group of devotees has long recognized the value of
Janet's contribution to psychopathology and psychology.
With the reprint ofJanet's Major Symptoms ofHysteria in 1965,
the publication of Ellenberger's The Discovery of the Uncon-
scious in 1970, and Hilgard's Divided Consciousness in 1977,
the importance ofJanet's contribution to the study of disso-
ciation and related phenomena became better known to the
English-speakingworld (cf.Nemiah, 1974, 1979, 1980; Perry,
1984; Perry & Lawrence, 1984; Decker, 1986; Haule, 1986).
Janet's contributions to the field are not limited to hysteria
and dissociation, but encompass a wide range ofsubjects, as
indicated by Ellenberger (1970) and a handful of other
English language publications indicate (cf. Horton, 1924;
Bailey, 1928; Mayo, 1948; Havens, 1966; Ey, 1968; Hart, 1983;
Haule, 1984; Pitman, 1984, 1987; Pope, Hudson, & Mialet,
1985).
The purpose of this paper is to reviewJanet's books on
hysteria and dissociation and to provide a summary of the
central concepts in each of them. A brief description of
Janet's career enables the reader to place these studies in
their historical perspective. For a more complete biography,
the reader is referred to Ellenberger's encyclopedic opus,
The Discovery of the Unconscious (1970).
Pierre Janet
Pierre Janet was born in Paris on May 30, 1859, to an
upper middle class family. He maintained a distinguished
academic standing in the finest French schools, dividing his
interests between science and philosophy. At twenty-two
when he embarked upon his professional career as professor
of philosophy in Le Havre, two events had had a profound
effect upon him. The first, in 1881, was the International
Electrical Exposition in Paris, where it became clear that the
future would be dominated by science, technology and
electricity. The second, in 1882, was the publication of
Charcot's paper, which reestablished the scientific status of
hypnosis (Ellenberger, 1970 p. 335).
At Le Havre Janet devoted his spare time to volunteer
work with patients at the hospital and to psychiatric research.
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In search of a subject for his doctoral dissertation, he was
introduced to Leonie, a 45-year-old woman whom he proved
could be hypnotized directly and from a distance. His experi-
ments were reported in a paper read at the Societe de
Psychologie Physiologique in Paris in 1885, under the chair-
manship of Charcot. Although these experiments (Janet,
1885, 1886a) gave Janet instant fame, he soon realized that
many reports of his work were inaccurate. He became
suspicious ofparapsychological research, preferring instead
to pursue systematic investigation of the phenomena of
hypnosis and suggestion. Influenced by the work of Ribot
and Charcot, Janet dedicated himself to the study of modi-
fication of states of consciousness in Leonie and hysterical
patients in Le Havre's psychiatric hospital (Janet, 1886b,
1887, 1888). He jokingly named his little ward "Salle Saint-
Charcot" in the popular fashion ofnaming French hospitals
wards after saints (Ellenberger, 1970).Janet read everything
he could on hypnosis, finding a wealth of important clinical
descriptions in Bertrand, Deleuze, and Despine, the old
masters of magnetism. He discovered that important theo-
retical notions had been developed by early researchers such
as Main de Biran, Moreau de Tours, and Taine.
Janet found that the concept of dissociation is a concept
first found in the work of Moreau de Tours in 1845. Its
equivalent term psychological dissolution (desagregation psy-
chologique), also introduced by Moreau de Tours in 1845,
was equally well received. Janet's extraordinarily exact and
lucid descriptions ofexperimental and clinical observations
(cf. Binet, 1890) of these concepts and his theoretical system
continue to receive praise in modern reviews ofhis works (d.
Pope, Hudson, & Mialet, 1985; Pitman, 1987).
In 1889, Charcot invited Janet to the Salpetriere, the
famous psychiatric teaching hospital in Paris, where he
became head of a psychological laboratory. While continu-
ing his vocation as professor of philosophy and publishing a
textbook in that field (Janet, 1894c), Janet began to study
medicine, completing his studies in 1893 with his doctoral
thesis (Janet, 1893b). During this period he published a
number of papers describing his innovative therapeutic
approaches to hysteria. As Ellengerger (1970, pp. 764-5)
remarked, had Janet published the case histories of Lucie,
Marie, Marcelle, Madame D., and the others he had success-
fully treated at that time, no one would ever have questioned
his priority in discovering what was later called cathartic
therapy. Recently, however, Van der Hart and Van der
Velden (1987) showed that the Dutch physician Andries
Hoek (1868) provided the first case study ofcathartic hypno-
therapy.
Janet's clinical research art the Salpetriere formed the
basis of his theory of hysteria. These findings formed the
thesis for his medical degree and were applauded both
within France and internationally. Janet seemed to have a
brilliant career ahead when, three weeks after his promotion
to Doctor of Medicine, Charcot died suddenly. A new era in
psychiatry began. Many of Charcot's ideas about the pre-
sumably physical nature of hypnosis were discarded in favor
of the views of the Nancy School of Hypnosis (Bernheim);
viz., that hypnosis was a psychological phenomenon based
purely on suggestion. Precisely because of its established
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psychological nature, hypnosis itself became discredited.
Janet was soon the only one in the Salpetriere using
hypnosis in his research and clinical work. He published
many studies on hysteria (of. Janet, 1898a & b; Raymond &
Janet, 1898), then turned his attention to another broad
category of neuroses: psychasthenia with its inherent obses-
sions, phobias, tics, etc. This resulted in the two volumes on
Obsessions and Psychasthenia (Les Obsessions et la Psychasthinie)
published in 1903 (d. Pitman, 1984, 1987).
Meanwhile, the climate at the Salpetriere worsened for
Janet. Babinski, formerly loyal to Charcot, but invested
exclusively in the neurological portion of Charcot's teach-
ing, began to regard hysteria as essentially the result of
suggestion, and even as a form of malingering; a disorder
able to disappear entirely by the influence of persuasion
(Babinski, 1901, 1909). Dejerine regarded hypnosis as morally
reprehensible (d. Janet, 1919; Ellenberger, 1970). In 1910
when Dejerine became Director of the Salpetriere , Janet,
the champion of both hysteria and hypnosis, had to leave.
Although not honored in his own country,Janetwasverywell
received in North and South America where he visited and
lectured regularly beginning in 1904. He received an honor-
ary doctorate at Harvard's tricentenary celebration in 1936.
His Harvard lectures in 1908 were published as The Major
Symptoms ofHysteria (Janet, 1907) and are currently garner-
ing much attention again.
A decade earlier, in 1896,Janet had become Professor of
Psychology at the College de France, a famous institute of
advanced learning in Paris. First as Ribot's substitute, then as
his successor, Janet held this chair until 1934. Many of his
courses have been published, complete or in summary (d.
Janet, 1919, 1920/21, 1926b, 1927, 1929b, 1929, 1932a&b,
1925a, 1936; Horton, 1924; Bailey, 1928). Obliged to present
a new subject every year,Janet used his classes as a means of
combining his psychopathological findings and normal psy-
chology into a unified system. This endeavor began appear-
ing in Psychological Automatism where he remarked that for
those who know mental illness well, it is not difficult to study
normal psychology (Janet, 1889).
Janet possessed a remarkable talent for integrating very
different materials into a harmonious whole (Delay, 1960).
One of these results was the formulation of his Psychology of
Conduct (psychologie de la conduite), a major effort to
synthesize a multitude of behavioral observations with an
evolutionary philosophical approach. In his book, Les stades
de l'evolution psychologique, he presented a hierarchically
ordered classification of human activity from simplest to
most complex (Janet, 1926b). AlthoughJanet's dissociation
theory has been rediscovered, there is still little awareness of
what treasures are hidden in his later work on the psychology
of conduct and in his psychopathological studies, such as
those on paranoid schizophrenia (Janet, 1932c, d & e,
1936b, 1937, 1945, 1947a). Janet's last unfinished work
concerning the psychology of religious belief remains un-
published (Janet, 1947b). It is estimated that the published
work of this great man, who according to his daughter, did
not know the act ofrest (Pichot:Janet, 1950), amounted to
at least 17,000 printed pages (Prevost, 1973, p. 10).
SinceJanet's primary purpose was to inspire his pupils to
independent thinking on the basis ofempirical facts, he did
not leave a school or ideological movement behind. Instead,
time and again, open-minded researchers and clinicians
discover thatJanet made the same observations as they, and
that his theoretical explanations of this information remain
viable sources of inspiration. This discovery extends well
beyond the field of dissociation.
The following is a chronological review of books which
Janet published over a 30-year period. It begins with L )tuta-
matisme Psychologique (Jan~t, 1889) which first appeared 100
years ago and ends with Les Medications Psychologiques (Janet,
1919). In reading his books, it becomes apparent that one
series of works shows Janet's remarkable abilities of classifi-
cation (abilities which are also reflected in his being an
ardent botanist). In these studies he mapped the various
manifestations of hysteria which then became the founda-
tion of his hypotheses about their origins, nature and rela-
tionship. These hypotheses and observations form Janet's
dissociation theory. In another series ofstudies the emphasis
is on the psychological analysis of one or a few case descrip-
tions in depth. The last book reviewed reflects Janet's at-
tempt to delineate the various forms of psychotherapy he
encountered in the literature and the dynamic psychother-
apywhich he himselfpracticed as a eclectic psychotherapist.
L 'Automatisme Psychologique
PsychologicaIAutomatisms,Janet's first book in psychology,
introduces his dissociation theory and his model of the
functional and structural elements of the mind. It describes
psychological phenomena observed in hysteria, hypnosis,
suggestion, possession states, and spiritism, though it clearly
goes beyond those topics (Janet, 1889). As the book's sub-
title, Experimental-psychological essay on the inferior forms of
human activity suggests,Janet began with the study ofhuman
activity in its simplest and most rudimen tary forms. His goal
was to demonstrate that this elementary activity forms the
psychological automatism: automatic because it is regular and·
pre-determined, and psychological because it is accompa-
nied by sensibility and consciousness (cf. Van der Hart &
Horst, 1989).
In presenting his model of the mind,Janet distinguished
between two different ways that mind functions: activities
that preserve and reproduce the past and activities which are
directed towards synthesis and creation (i.e., integration).
Normal thought is produced by a combination of the two
acts which are interdependent and regulate each other.
Integrative activity "reunites more or less numerous given
phenomena into a new phenomenon different from its
elements. At every moment of life, this activity effectuates
new combinations which are necessary to maintain the
organism in equilibrium with the changes of the surround-
ings." In short, this function organizes the present. Repro-
ductive activities only manifest integrations that were cre-
ated in the past. .
Janet felt psychological automatism was best studied in
individuals who exhibit it in extreme degrees-psychiatric
patients SUffering from hysteria. In them, the integrative
activity is significantly diminished, causing the development
of symptoms that appear as magnifications of the activity
designed to preserve and reproduce the past. Janet discov-
ered that most of them suffered from unresolved (and there-
fore, dissociated) traumatic memories. In this population he
studied catalepsy, paralysis, anesthesia, contractures, monoi-
deic and polyideic somnambulisms, and successive exis-
tences (as he then termed multiple personalities). His analy-
sis represented a departure from classical psychology which
made a sharp distinction among intellect, affect and will.
Janet concluded that even at the very lowest level of psychic
life, where feeling or sensation exists, movement also exists.
Thus there is no consciousness without activity; even an idea
has the natural tendency to develop into an act.
In his structural view of the mind, Janet aligned with
earlier French authors such as Maine de Brian, Moreau de
Tours and Taine, believing that all human activity had a
conscious component. He put this on a par with the inner
regulating activities of the mind, the proprioceptive func-
tions as Sherrington (1906) called them. His predecessors
and contemporaries generally believed that psychological
automatism consisted of acts performed unconsciously and
therefore, mechanically (cf. Despine, 1880)_Janet believed
that the behavior patterns he observed were determined by
conscious factors, even though they were maladaptive de-
partures from the habitual response patterns of the person-
ality. Using the term automatic did not exclude the notion of
self-awareness, as the Greek terms autos (self) and maiomai
(striving for, to exert oneself for) are paired in this concept
(Van der Hart & Horst, 1989). Janet stated that in psycho-
logical automatism, consciousness did not belong to the
personal consciousness, was not connected to the personal
perception, and lacked the personality's sense of self (idee
du moi). This consciousness existed rather at a subconscious
level. As Ellenberger points out, few people realize that itwas
Janet who first coined the term subconscious (1970m p.
406). Janet thus differentiated among levels of conscious-
ness. Since the study of elementary forms of activity was a
study of basic forms of sensibility and consciousness, he
therewith emphasized the unity of body and mind.
Psychological automatism could be manifested in total
as well as in partial automatism. The former implies that the
mind is completely dominated by a reproduction of past
experience as in the case of somnambulistic states and
hysterical crises. The latter occurs when the automatism occu-
pies only a part of the mind; for instance, in cases of
systematic anesthesia, where the touch of an object is not
registered by the personal consciousness, but is to be found
in a second consciousness, a hidden observer as Hilgard (1977)
would say almost a century later.
In both total and partial automatism there exist subcon-
scious psychological phenomena-systems of fixed ideas
and functions-which have escaped personal control and
perception. These dissociated systems are isolated from the
personal consciousness. Some of them continue to exist in
rudimentary form without a sense of self, as is the case with
catalepsy in which only a single thought and single auto-
matic action appears to occupy the mind. Less primitive is
the hysterical crisis, a dissociative episode complete with
amnesia, in which the patient may reenact a traumatic event.
Janet presented this in the case of Marie, reported in toto by
5
,
DISSOCIATION, Vol. 2, No. I: March 1989
~- ~ - - If
I
AREADER'S GUIDE TO PIERRE JANET ON DISSOCIATION ~~\
'.'
Ellenberger (1970, pp, 361-364), She suffered from crises in
which she continuously reexperienced the trauma of her
first menstruation as well as permanent blindness in one eye
from an earlier childhood traumaJanet' s treatment demon-
strated how correcting Marie's cognitive distortions from
the menstrual event at age 13 and modifying the content of
the dissociated states in which her trauma at age 6 was
reexperienced led to the disappearance of these states and
their related symptoms.
Many dissociated elements and systems tend to combine
themselves with other such phenomena to form more
complex states. Certain'dreams, certain fixed ideas, more or
less subconscious, become centers around which a large
number ofpsychological phenomena arrange themselves to
become a distinct personality, complete with its own life
history. These successive existences, asJanet called alternat-
ing personalities, may interact with external reality, and
develop further by absorbing and retaining new impres-
sions. Although he was not so clear in this respect, Janet's
examples showed that these existences could also develop
higher psychological functions such as autonomous will and
critical judgement.
Binet (1890) pointed out this particular vagueness in
Janet's work, which in our opinion, was related to a paradox
Janet encountered. He had intended to study ways in which
human activity in its simplest form manifested in hysterics.
He found, however, that certain of these dissociated elemen-
tary forms of activity were highly developed, including the
abili ty to reason, to makejudgements, sustain memories, etc.
Contrary to what he expected, in tegrative and creative activi-
ties were present at the level of personality (complete with
sense ofself), but remained outside ofpersonal awareness in
the normal waking state. It was this incongruity-that while
studying the most simple he discovered the most complex-
that gave the initial presentation of findings in this work its
aura of apparent confusion.
ThusJanet's observations led from the hypothesis of the
absence of the function of creative synthesis in the person-
ality to the recognition of the presence of this function in a
state which was dissociated from conscious awareness. Be-
cause this very function (often used to connote personality)
was unavailable in the waking state but accessible in the
hypnotic state, Janet was led first to the discovery of the
dissociated personality and then to the necessity ofa formu-
lating of dissociation theory.
Janet related the origin of subconscious phenomena in
hysterical patients to the narrowingoftheirfield ofconsciousness.
This concept refers to the reduction of the number of
psychological phenomena that can be simultaneouslyunited
or integrated in one and the same personal consciousness.
Some register in conscious awareness, others are relegated
to a subconscious area in much the same way that central and
peripheral items in a visual field are noticed. InJanet's view,
narrowing the field of consciousness is one of the two basic
characteristics of hysteria. The other is dissociation.
Dissociation and mental dissolution, terms originally
introduced by Moreau de Tours (1845), denote the manner
in which this narrowing of the field ofconsciousness occurrs
in hysterical patients. Dissociation occurs when different
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factors disturb the integrative capacity. This disturbance
leads to the splitting off or doubling (didoublement), separa-
tion and isolation of certain psychological regulating activi-
ties. These dissociated systems of activities (states of con-
sciousness) vary in complexity from a simple image, thought
or statement and its attendant feelings or bodily manifesta-
tions to the alter personalities of patients with multiple
personality disorder. Alters have their own identities, life
histories, and enduring patterns of perceiving, thinking
about and relating to the environment which is distinct from
the habitual personality's mode of being in the world (Van
der Hart & Horst, 1989).
The dissociated activity clusters or personalities either
alternate with the personal consciousness in controlling the
body, or coexist with it. Indeed, in later work Janet (1909,
1910b) stated that in certain patients, a dissociated person-
ality, which could be evoked in hypnosis, was in fact a
healthier state of consciousness than the co-called waking
state.
While clinicians such as Bernheim and Babinski re-
garded hypersuggestibility as the basic characteristic of
hysterical patients, Janet stated that hypersuggestibility
depended on the narrowing of the field of consciousness
and the predisposition to dissociation. The patient is sug-
gestible because dissociated parts ofhis mind lack the higher
mental functions of critical judgement. By distracting the
patient, the hypnotist is able to communicate directly with
these parts. Ironically, Janet also encountered dissociated
states which were not at all suggestible, but showed strong
will and judgement of their own.
Janet introduced the concept of psychological misery to
denote the mental status of patients in whom the field of
consciousness was narrowed and whose integrative powers
were strongly diminished, thus allowing dissociative phe-
nomena to occur. In later writings he placed this mental
misery in the broader framework of the oscillations of the
mental level which take place in all human beings (Janet,
1905,1919/25,1920/1,1934).
Physical illness, exhaustion, and vehement emotion
such as the fear and anger inherent in traumatic experiences
are primary causes of psychological misery. This state is
marked by a serious decline of the integrative power of the
mind and, in hysterical patients, an increase in dissociative
phenomena. In Psychological Automatism as well as an earlier
paper (Janet, 1886b), Janet showed that such intense emo-
tional experiences may become dissociated (complete with
amnesia) and may reappear in hysterical crises. They may
also become subconscious centers around which other psy-
chological phenomena arrange themselves, as in the cases of
Marie and Lucie.
A short summary cannot do. justice to the wealth of
psychological observations and ideas contained in Psychologi-
cal Automatism. There are many findings in this book which
could stimulate future research. One intriguing example
concerns the variations in sensory perception in different
somnambulistic states. Janet noted that a patient may be
predominantly visual in the waking state, auditory in one
somnambulistic state, kinesthetic in another, and even have
a state of "perfect somnambulism" in which the balanced
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.integration of all se~ses exists. It is unfortunate indeed that
this book has never been translated. One full century after its
original publication in French, an English version would be
timelier than ever.
L 'Etat Mental des Hystiriques
This book originally consisted of two parts published
separately under the same title with different subtitles. The
first part was subtitled The Mental Stigmata ofHystencals (Les
stigmates mentaux des hystenques) (Janet, 1893a). The second,
subtitledThe Mental Accidents ofHystencals (Les accidents men-
taux des hystenques) (Janet, 1894a), was the commercial edi-
tion of his medical dissertation, Contribution a l'etude des
accidents mentaux chez les hysteriques (Janet, 1893b). Both
works, translated into English in 1901, are careful descrip-
tive studies based on clinical observations of 120 ofJanet's
own patients and 20 of his colleagues', one of whom was
Despine's patient Estelle (Despine, 1840). Recently Fine
reported on this case (Fine, 1988).
On the subject of his own observations, Janet remarked
that he was in the habit of writing down everything his
subjects and patients said and did, a habit which earned him
the nickname Doctor Pencil (cf. Janet, 1930). To his analyses
of these systematized observations,Janet added his tentative
theoretical interpretations which can be reduced to the
same elements as his dissociation theory. These interpreta-
tions were experimentally tested in a small number of
patients.
Stigmata and accidents were the terms given to the symp-
toms of hysteria. In distinguishing between them Janet
employed a well established classification system that had its
roots in the medical tradition of his time. The stigmata of
hysteria are the essential constitutive symptoms of the ill-
ness, as enduring, persistent, and permanent as the illness
itself. The patient who may feel himself weakened in some
way, but who is unable to specify correctly the symptoms
from which he suffers, presents with a relative indifference
to his symptomatology. Janet suggests that clinicians should
take the initiative in identifying these chronic stigmata, since
patients do not usually report them. Accidents are acute, the
transient, paroxystic symptoms which occur intermittently
and are experienced by the patients as painful. These acci-
dents can be understood as representations ofpsychological
trauma (cf. Meares, Hamshire, Gordon, & Kraiuhin, 1985).
Thus, hysterical anesthesia is a stigma, and an attack (acute
episode) of hysteria is an accident. In later work Janet
detached himself from this medically-based position, and
the concept of personality became dominant in his explana-
tory view (Janet, 1929).
In Part One, Janet dealt with anesthesias, amnesias,
abulias, disorders of the movements, and modifications of
the character-all ofwhich he regarded as mental stigmata.
For each of these negative symptoms (stigmata) he carefully
described its different forms and manifestations. With re-
gard to the anesthesias, he denoted systematic, localized and
general. He regarded hysterical anesthesia as a strong and
continuous distraction rendering the patients unable to
attach certain sensations to their personalities because ofthe
narrowing of the field of consciousness. These sensations
VAN DER HART/FRIEDMAN
thus existed in a subconscious manner. The same kind of
analysis was made with regard to the amnesias. Using many
examples,Janet showed that hysterical amnesia often devel-
oped in the wake ofvehement emotions aroused and disso-
ciated during traumatic experiences.
Abulia, a concept which receives little attention in cur-
rent psychiatry and psychology, concerns a degeneration of
the will which manifests in tendencies towards indolence,
hesitancy, indecision, impotence to act, and inability to
focus attention on ideas. Abulia is not limited to hysteria, but
in this category of disorders it characteristically presents in
the preservation of subconscious acts and the loss of per-
sonal perception of acts in current reality. As an essential
component of many disorders, this stigma increases in
dominance as the patient's state ofmind deteriorates. There
is a noticeable increase in the tendency to daydream, in
apathy or anhedonia, in the patient's proneness to emo-
tional outbursts. This exhaustion of one's vitality and inten-
sification of abulia that Janet observed in his hysterical
patients is commonly seen by clinicians today, especially
those treating chronic PTSD (cf. Brown & Van der Hart,
1989). Titchener (1986) speaks of a posttraumatic decline,
ofwhich apathy, a tendency t!=> withdraw from normal inter-
action with the environment, and a hypochondriacal preoc-
cupation with one's own body are characteristic.
As Janet described the manner in which hysteria modi-
fied the character of his patients, we recognize additional
observations currently made under the rubrick of posttrau-
matic decline: recurrent dreaming of the traumatic event,
including day-dreaming; constricted affect or alexithymia;
and simultaneously, extreme excitability with a tendency to
emotional outbursts. It is important that we not limit abulia
to being a specific stigma of hysteria. This pattern of 1)
weakening of a patient's personal will, decisiveness and
ability to initiate activity; 2) an increase in day-dreaming and
apathy; and 3) exaggerated emotional responses underlies a
number of currently identified disorders.
Janet concluded Part One with the statement that hys-
teria is a defect of the unity of the mind, manifesting itselfon
the one hand in a diminishing of the personal synthesis, and
on the other, in the preserving of past phenomena which
reappear in an amplified manner.
In Part Two,Janetfirst tried to unite the infinitely varied
spectrum of hysterical accidents by referring to their shared
mental aspects: suggestion, subconscious acts, and fixed
ideas. He considered that the complete and automatic
development of ideas occurred outside of the will and
personal perception of the subject. "Suggestions, with their
automatic and independent development, are the real para-
sites of the mind" (Janet, 1901, p. 267). The performance of
acts which result from suggestions is isolated, separated from
the personality-that is why they should be called subcon-
scious acts.
Patients suffering from hysteria in aJanetian sense are,
as a rule, highly suggestible. Recent research with patients
suffering from dissociative disorders and posttraumatic stress
disorder confirms this (Bliss, 1986; Spiegel, Hunt, & Don-
dershine, 1988) .Janet analyzed conditions in which patients
are less suggestible. Two of the main conditions of lowered
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suggestibility were found in subjects who were preoccupied
with a certain fixed idea of their own, and being cured. A
cure implied a strongly diminished tendance towards disso-
ciating and an increasingly integrated personality. Since no
complexly-developed dissociated parts (selves) exist in an
integrated personality, by definition, there are none to
evoke. Artificial somnambulism, in the restricted sense of
deep hypnosis, can barely be evoked, whereas, a lighter
trance state in which continuity of the sense of self is
maintained, continues to be possible. Although Janet did
encounter some exceptions to his rule, he did not give up his
position (which is not universally accepted today). Thus,
near the end of the treatment, one of his patients, Marcelle,
while under hypnosis reported via automatic writing that she
was cured forever. As she still showed the dissociative phe-
nomena of deep hypnosis and automatic writing, Janet was
pessimistic about her prognosis (Janet, 1891/98a).
While suggestions are generally given by others, fixed
ideas usually develop as the resl.llt of accidental causes, such
as traumatic experiences and hysterical episodes. They tend
to dominate the mind completely in dreams and somnam-
bulistic states. They also disturb normal consciousness dur-
ing the waking state by sending message to it. For example,
Janet wrote ofa woman walking on the street. She had short
dissociative episodes in which she made a curious jumping
motion. In hypnosis Janet discovered that she was reen-
acting her suicide attempt: a jump into the Seine. In an
example of a contraction, a sailor continuously walked in a
forward bent position, reenacting the trauma of having had
a beam fall and press against his chest. Many case examples
were cited to show how mental accidents such as dysesthe-
sias, hyperesthesias, tics and choric movements, paralyses
and contractures are based on fixed ideas. In most cases,
patients are amnestic to these fixed ideas which also affect
the stigmata (basic symptomatology) by diminishing the
patients' powers of personal perception.
Hysterical attacks are violent, momentary, and periodi-
cally recurring events during which the patient's normal
consciousness usually disappears. Janet categorized several
types of emotional attacks: attacks of tics and clownism, of
fixed ideas and ecstasies, and complete attacks. During
attacks the underlying fixed ideas are usually transformed
into vivid hallucinations and bodily movements. Janet re-
garded anorexia nervosa in most cases as hysterical in na-
ture. An example of the attack of a fixed idea would be the
inner commands an anorexic hears when trying to eat,
"Don't eat. You do not have the need to eat."
Janet described the various forms of somnambulism:
abnormal states of consciousness, distinct from normal life,
which often have their own memories, and for which the
subject develops amnesia upon returning to his normal
state. This amnesia is due to the fact that the organization of
psychological phenomena of the somnambulistic state are
united around certain sensations or fixed ideas which are
not perceived by the normal sense of self (habitual person-
ality). When the patient is cured, these states disappear, i.e.,
they have fused into one state, asJanetquoted from Despine
(1840).
Finally, he distinguished the hysterical psychosis which
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is due to the dominance of abulia (decrease in the level of
mental functioning) and an increase in mental confusion.
Patients with this disorder tend to confound their waking
dreams with normal perceptions and with memories, both
normal and traumatic. Their hallucinations are particularly
vivid and often involve all the senses (d. Van der Hart &
Witztum, 1989).
Janet concluded his psychological analysis of hystelia
with the tentative definition that it is a form of mental
dissolution characterized by the tendency to a permanent
and complete splitting (dedoublement) of the personality.
Although the distinction between mental stigmata and
mental accidents is not always clear, it is still the best work to
date for instructing clinicians in recognizing the many
manifestations of those symptoms which are best explained
by Janet's own dissociation theory. It is also an excellent
source of reference, demonstrating how much was known
about dissociation in the psychiatric world over a century
ago. The English edition was recently reprinted.
Nevroses et idees fixes
During and after his preparation of The Mental State of
Hystericals, Janet published numerous articles in which he
presented more detailed descriptions, narratives and analy-
ses of patients. These papers were collected in the first
volume ofNeuroses andFixed Ideas (Neuroses etIdeesFixes:Etudes
experimentales sur les troubles de la volonte, de l'attention, de la
memoire; sur les emotions, les idees obsidantes et leur traitement)
(Janet, 1998a). Ellenberger (1970) mentions several of these
extreme and interesting cases in detail.
Fixed ideas (idees fixes) are thoughts or mental images
which take on exaggerated proportions, have a high emo-
tional charge, and, in hysterical patients, become isolated
from the habitual personality, or personal consciousness
(Janet, 1894a/98a). When dominating consciousness, they
serve as the basis for behavior. These ideas also manifest
themselves in what we now term flashbacks or intrusive
thoughts. Janet considered them dissociative phenomena
which were parts of subconscious fixed ideas.
Fixed ideas can remain isolated or become linked with
new impressions or other fixed ideas. They are perceived
during dreams, dissociative episodes such as hysterical at-
tacks, and in many of the communicating devices employed
during hypnosis (which is the medium of choice for uncov-
ering and exploring fixed ideas).
Janet made an important distinction between primary
and secondary fixed ideas. A primary fixed idea is the total
system or complex of images (visual, auditory, kinesthetic,
etc.) of a particular traumatic event plus the corresponding
emotions and behaviors. Secondary fixed ideas have the same
characteristics as primary fixed ideas and present after the
disappearance (through treatment) of the main fixed idea.
Janet classified them into three groups. 1) Derivative fixed
ideas result from association with the main fixed idea. For
example, if death is the primary fixed idea, a morbid fear of
cemeteries or funeral flowers could result. 2) Stratified fixed
ideas result from traumata in the patient' s life history which
were sustained prior to the one which causes the full-blown
hysterical or dissociative disorder. We experience this in
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treatment when the removal of a primary fixed idea is
replaced by another fixed idea rather than by the complete
elimination of the patient's problem. Stratified fixed ideas
correspond to the present-day notion of layers of traumata.
Janet advocated a procedure of treating each principal fixed
idea until all are addressed, usually beginning with the most
recent and proceeding to the earliest. 3) Accidentalfixed ideas
are absolutely new and produced by an incident in one's
present daily life. If treated immediately, they are easy to
eradicate. Their existence proves the nature of the patient's
mental state of hypersensitivity. Today we would call an
accidental fixed idea the conditioned or stress-activated
response to a trigger. We recognize this in patients' overreac-
tions or distorted responses to seemingly neutral stimuli in
the current environment. In dissociative disorders, acciden-
tal fixed ideas would produce a variety of dissociative re-
sponses, depending on the nature of the dissociative disor-
der. In multiple personality disorder it is often seen as the
switch to another personality (Friedman, 1988).
In treatment, if one discovers the primary fixed idea,
one can treat the core of the traumatic problem. This may
not, however, resolve the secondary set of problems and
symptomatology which require their own treatment. Secon-
dary fixed ideas can produce behaviors in response to
previous traumata or in response to the primary fixed idea.
If these behaviors alone are eliminated or corrected in
treatment, the heart of the problem still exists. Obviously,
both need to be considered in conscientious treatment to
avoid relapse or partial cure.
The case ofJustine provides a rich exampIe of treatment
on both levels (Janet, 1894b). Janet dedicated a 55-page
report toJustine, a 40-year-old outpatient at the Salpetriere.
Following a serious contagious disease at age 6 and a subse-
quent bout of typhoid fever, she exhibited severe dissocia-
tive phenomena, changing from a sweet and gentle girl to an
obstinate brat. She became phobic about snails and worms.
To cure her of this at age 9, the family physician placed a
large snail on her throat. Justine fell over backwards, losing
consciousness and breaking several bones. Upon regaining
consciousness, she was obsessed by the memory of the snail
on her throat.
When her cat was badly injured and put to sleep,Justine
reacted with an hysterical attack accompanied by a rash.
More seizures and rashes occurred over time; in addition,
Justine grew extremely fat. Her mother was a nurse who had
to watch dying patients, andJustine sometimes helped her.
Mter this she developed a morbid fear of disease and death.
Finally, at 17,Justine saw the naked corpses of two patients
who died ofcholera, resulting in her violent fear ofcholera.
More than 10 years later, this image would haunt her during
hysterical attacks. Several times a day she would become pale
and sweat and shout repeatedly, "Cholera... it's taking me!"
She had an ever-present, severe phobia for the word cholera.
In this case Janet observed the fixed ideas in detail,
finding that there were primary and secondary fixed ideas.
One of his techniques was to evoke and modifY the image of
this primary fixed idea during hypnosis. In treatment,Janet
induced artificial somnambulism and discovered what occu-
pied Justine's mind during an hysterical crisis. She saw the
image of the two naked corpses, smelled the revolting stench
of decay, heard the tolling of a bell and the cries of chotera,
and perceived screaming, vomiting, diarrhea and cramps of
the victims. This traumatic event involved all her sensory
perceptions, forming one fixed idea, one psychological
system that completely dominated her consciousness when
it arose, leaving no room for other thoughts or actions.Janet
found the only way to reach Justine was to enter her private
drama as a participant. As she relived the scene in hypnosis,
in applying his substitution techniqueJanet dialogued with her
within this context to modifY the contents (cf. Van der Hart,
Brown, & Braun, 1989). Over a period of time he was able to
suggest gradual transformations of the images: the corpses
were provided with clothes, and one was given the identity of
a Chinese general whom Justine had seen at a Universal
Exposition. When she could see the general stand up and
march comically, the images ofthe traumatic event ceased in
hysterical attacks and persisted only in dreams. Janet ad-
dressed this by suggesting innocuous dreams. The trauma
no longer occurred in dreams. This success resulted after
one year of treatment.
In spite of the transformation of the proprioceptive
primary fixed idea, Justine remained phobic to the word
cholera. This fixed idea persisted on both the conscious and
subconscious levels. While engaging in another activity,
Justine could be observed whispering the word cholera.Janet
directed his attention to the word itself, suggesting that itwas
the family name of the Chinese general, and dividing it into
three parts: Cho-le-ra. He then hadJustine associate the first
syllable with different endings in automatic writing, such as
chocolate. Next he used the sound of the first syllable, co and
paired it with different endings: comme, caton, cororiko, etc.,
until itwas no longer associated with the word cholera. In the
end, Justine could no longer remember the word that had
tortured her, nor did a new cholera epidemic have any effect
on her. This phase of treatment lasted ten months.
Janet was planning to ridJustine of her other hallucina-
tions when they disappeared spontaneously. And still the
patient was not cured. Mter the disappearance of the pri-
mary fixed idea, secondary fixed ideas began to develop.
Instead of the fear of death and disease,Justine exhibited a
morbid fear ofcoffins and cemeteries: derivative fixed ideas.
She refused to eat fruit or vegetables: a derivative fixed idea
in response to fears of cholera. She also suffered from a
multitude of accidental fixed ideas. We can assume that
Janet treated them immediately by disconnecting the stimu-
lus (trigger) from Justine's automatic association of it to a
trauma. His general approach ofeducating her mind, stimulat-
ing her integrative capacities, helped Justine to stop the
development of these accidental fixed ideas herself.
Janet focused inJustine's case almost exclusively on her
traumatic memories regarding the cholera deaths, and on
related secondar fixed ideas. He believed that stratified
fixed ideas did not play an important role in this case. Today,
we would probably pay more attention to the exploration of
childhood traumata. For example, we would want to dis-
cover if justine's childhood phobias of worms and snails
were related to experiences of sexual abuse.
A final contribution introduced in this work is the
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phenomenon of the patient's deep involvement with the
therapist, known as rapport magnitique by the magnetizers
(Janet, 1897).Janet recognized this intense involvement as
a very complex phenomenon. Although erotic' elements
were present in the rapport, they were not the main thera-
peutic concern. He viewed the relationship more in terms of
an attachmen t theory in which the need for guidance played
the significant role. In treatment the therapist first assumes
the responsibility of directing the patient's mind, then
gradually reduces that direction to a minimum. This treat-
mentapproach corresponds to modern procedures in which
the therapist takes the initiative in building up patients' ego
strengths and resources and guides their decision-making
processes. As patients acquire the missing skills and employ
them in a functional manner, the therapist gradually disen-
gages from the process.Janet believed that therapists should
educate their patients to accept the therapists' authority and
guidance and then systematically reduce their domination
of the patients, ultimately teaching patients to do without
the therapist. If therapists neglected this point, only tempo-
rary cures resulted.
This process could be complicated by la passion somnam-
bulique, the patient's overpowering need to be hypnotized by
his own therapist. This passion can become an addiction and
bejust as dangerous (d. Haule, 1986) .Janet concluded that
high suggestibility is the mark of a great weakness of mind
which can lead patients to become cathected to both the
therapist and the hypnotic state. "Such patients not only
crave to be hypnotized, but have a permanent need to
confess to the psychiatrist whose picture they keep con-
stantly in their subconscious mind, and to be scolded and
directed by him" (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 369).Janetrealized
that this craving to be hypnotized and guided by the thera-
pist created a problem. At the same time, he deemed the
somnambulistic influence indispensable to the cure. In this
dilemma, Janet recognized the value of the initial bonding
with the therapist, and how the boundary issues in the
therapeutic alliance can be confused by the patient's desire
for a symbiotic relationship.
His solution was to maintain a delicate balance in both
areas. Therapists should utilize the high hypnotizability of
the patient without permitting the somnambulistic passion
to develop to a dangerous point that makes treatment im-
practical. In the same way that therapists gradually withdraw
from the guidance process and turn it over to tlle patient,
they can use the hypnotic state as a treatment technique
without allowing themselves or the the altered state itself to
become the dominant focus of the patient's attention. Today
we know that there is often a point in treatment when it is
appropriate to explain this addiction to dissociation to
patients with dissociative disorders. We can then teach
patients to recognize the onset of the desire to dissociate and
teach them the coping skills that would reduce the need to
dissociate, or to substitute another activity for the trance
state.
Janet discussed this in the case ofJustine (Janet, 1984b).
As her treatment progressed,Janet spaced her sessions from
several times a week at the beginning to once a month in the
third year. By then Justine had frequent visions ofJanet in
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which she heard his voice offering her good advice. This
counsel was not a repetition of what Janet had said in
sessions, but originated fromJustine and was of a novel and
wise nature. Although it developed as a result ofher associa-
tion withJanet, it appeared more in the form of introjection
than a dependency state.
Janet was quick to point out that reduction of sessions
alone did not cure the dependency factor nor the somnam-
bulistic addiction. He told the story ofMorel's inpatientwho
was cured and discharged from the mental hospital. Mter-
wards, she came tO,see him at infrequent but regular inter-
vals. When Morel died, she had a relapse and had to be com-
mitted permanently. "Let us hope that this accident will not
happen too soon to our patients," Janet concluded (Janet,
1894b/98a, p. 212).
This book, with its wealth of relevant material does not
exist in English, nor has the French edition been reprinted
recently. Fortunately, photocopies of many of the original
papers which were collected for this volume should not be
too hard to obtain.
The second volume ofNeuroses andFixed Ideas (Fragments
des le{:ons cliniques de mardi sur les neuroses, les maladies produites
par les emotions, les idees obsedantes et leur traiement) was written
in collaboration with Raymond, Charcot's successor at the
Salpetriere (Raymond & Janet, 1989). It contains 152 case
presentations shown at the famous Tuesday clinical lessons
at the hospital. The first half of the book focuses on mental
disturbances such as abulias, mental confusions, deliriums
(hysterical psychoses), sleep attacks, somnambulisms, fugues,
and obsessions and impulses. Obsessions and related phe-
nomena became the main subject ofJanet's studies during
these years, resulting in the publication of Obsessions and
Psychasthenia (Janet, 1903) . The second halfconcentrates on
psychosomatic disorders such as disturbances of the sensibil-
ity, tics, paralyses, disturbances of language, and visceral
spasms. In many concisely described cases the authors show
how a disorder developed after patients had been exposed
to some kind of traumatic event to which they responded
very emotionally. This volume is a resource of the early, and
sometimes very first, documentations of treatment ap-
proaches which are so like those found in current literature,
one would believe they had been developed only recently
(cf. Van der Hart, 1988, p. vii).
THE MAJOR SYMPTOMS OF HYSTERIA
This book, published in English in 1907, contains the 15
lecturesJanet delivered at Harvard Medical School in 1906.
It demonstrates his fine didactic teaching qualities quite
clearly. It is both a highly readable introduction to the
phenomenology of hysteria, and a succinct summary of his
extensive studies in the field. In teaching about somnambu-
lism,Janet showed his penchant for paradox, 'Things hap-
pen as if an idea, a partial system of thoughts, emancipated
itself, became independent and developed itself on its own
account. The result is, on the one hand, that it develops far
too much, and on the other hand, that consciousness ap-
pears no longer to control it" (p. 42). He advised his students
not to be concerned with the obscurity of this remark: "Mter
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you have repeated 'it exactly in the same way with regard to
a thousand different phenomena, it will not be long before
you find yourself understanding it clearly" (p. 43). By focus-
ing most lessons on various accidents of hysteria rather than
on the stigmata, Janet greatly facilitated this understanding
in his students.
The lectures contain descriptions and comparisons of
the different types of somnambulism. In the generic sense,
somnambulism refers to that state of mind in which people
are so absorbed in their inner experience that congruent
contact with external reality is lost. When they do respond to
something in the outer environment, it is perceived as
playing a role within the domain of the inner experience.
The simplest form of somnambulism is monoideic. This
refers to that state ofmind in which a single fixed idea (often
a traumatic memory) dominates the abnormal state.
In complex somnambulisms like fugues and multiple
personality disorder, reality is not distorted to that degree.
The patient in a fugue usually has numerous recollections
and exhibits adequate social behavior in order to make the
journey that characterizes fugues. Patients with MPD can
function adequately in society while simultaneously sustain-
ing an hallucination. For example, they might perceive
themselves as wearing a dresswhen actuallywearing a sweater
and pants, or hold the self-perception that they are of a
different gender than their biological body, yet they enter
the appropriate public restrooms.
As he had done previously (Janet, 1894a), Janet classi-
fied the multiple personalities according to their intellectual
and memory capacities. He noted the obvious differences in
intellectual capacities of adult alter personalities maintain-
ing jobs and those of traumatized child alters. Regarding
memory, he spoke of certain alters having access only to
their own past experiences, while other alters can access the
memories of additional alters. All sorts of combinations of
intellectual functioning and memory among alters are pos-
sible, Janet noted, predating our discoveries in this area by
almost 100 years.
As mentioned earlier, the essence ofJanet's concept of
hysteria lay in the distinguishing of two layers of symptoms:
accidental or contingent symptoms (accidents) and basic,
permanent symptoms (stigmata). There are two types of
mental stigmata: 1) proper, which appear exclusively in
hysteria; and 2) common, which are shared by hysteria and
other mental disorders, notably psychasthenic neuroses.
Proper stigmata include narrowing of the field ofconscious-
ness, the existence ofsubconscious phenomena, suggestibil-
ity, anesthesia, and amnesia. Common stigmata encompass
feelings of incompleteness, lowering of the mental level of
functioning, emotional disturbances, troubles of the will,
and an inability to begin and end activities.
The lowering ofthe mental level, whichJanet introduced in
Obsessions and Psychasthenia (Janet, 1903), is a key concept in
his work. In L 'Automatisme Psychologique (Janet, 1889) when
he spoke of "psychological misery," Janet established the
important role ofthe breakdown ofhigher mental functions
in the development of mental disorders. In the last chapter
of The Major Symptoms ofHysteria Janet gave this notion its
place in his theory of hysteria by defining hysteria as a form
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of mental depression (lowered mental level offunctioning)
characterized by the narrowing of the field ofconsciousness
and an increased tendency toward the dissociation of the
system of ideas and functions that constitute the personality
(sense of self). Lastly, in this book,Janet considered briefly
the factors which may cause this lowering of the mental level.
Among them were emotional disturbances, e.g., as a re-
sponse to trauma, and severe physical illness.
So significant wereJanet's observations of the presence
of physical illness in contributing to the causation of hys-
teria, that atJanet's centennial Henri Baruk (1960), a lead-
ing French psychiatrist, hailed Janet as having given the
clinical basis to the development of modern psychophysiol-
ogy and expected future discoveries in neurophysiology to
derive fromJanet's work as well. Because of this emphasis on
the presence of severe physical illness in the formation of
psychopathology, clinicians now working with dissociative
disorders might inquire about this when taking patient his-
tories. An area to explore would be the corollaries of the
presence/absence of physical illness in cases of dissociative
disorders with the present trauma or physical and sexual
abuse reported today.
In his Foreword to the 1920 edition of this book,Janet
related the development of hysteria to his more recent
studies of "the oscillations of the mental level. "He dealt with
the role of "driving back"-the mechanism of repression-
which he addressed in more detail in Les Medications Psycholo-
giques (Janet 1919/25).Janet considered this "incapable of
giving a complete explanation of the hysterical neurosis." If
there is something like repression, it occurs more in psy-
chasthenia than in hysteria. Janet considered repression to
be a result ofexhaustion and a severe lowering of the mental
level of functioning: not the cause, but the consequence of
the psychasthenic depression.
The 1920 edition of The Major Symptoms of Hysteria was
reissued in 1965 and is still available. We consider it an
indispensable introductory work, not only for students of
psychotrauma and the dissociative disorders, but for all
students of psychiatry, clinical psychology, and neurology.
Les Nevroses
Aligned with the previous work is the delightful little
book, LesNivroses (Janet, 1909). It is consideredJanet's most
concentrated and synthetic work to date (Ey, 1968). Unfor-
tunately, neither a recent reprint nor any translation is
available.
In this book Janet systematically compared and con-
trasted the symptoms of hysteria and psychasthenia; the
latter being another fundamental condition of a variety of
mental disorders, such as obsessive-compulsive disorderand
the phobias (cf. Janet, 1903; Pitman, 1984, 1987). He con-
tTasted the hysterical fixed ideas (as in somnambulism) with
the psychasthenic obsessions; the hysterical amnesias with
the psychasthenic doubts; the paralyses with the phobias,
and so on. While the subconscious fixed idea of an hysteric
develops itself completely outside of the individual's per-
sonal perception and memory, the obsession of a psy-
chasthenic takes place in collaboration with one's whole
personality. Furthermore, it does so without developing
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itselfas completely as a fixed idea. Instead, the psychasthenic
is continuously doubting his idea. Janet defined psychasthe-
nia as a form of mental depression characterized by the
reduction ofpsychological tension (see below), by the diminu-
tion of the individual's ability to act on and perceive reality,
by the substitution ofinferior and exaggerated operations in
the form of doubts, agitations, anxieties, and by the obses-
sional ideas which express these disturbances (p. 367).
The often misunderstood notions of psychological force
and tension played instrumental roles in many of Janet's
psychopathological studies (d. Janet, 1919/25, 1920/1,
1932a). We return to his Obsessions and Psychasthenia (Janet,
1903) for an elaboration of these concepts. Psychologicalforce
is the quantity ofbasic psychic energy available to an individ-
ual. It exists in two forms: latent and manifest. Mobilizing
one's energy means transforming one's force from latent to
manifest. We can observe a person's psychological force
through the number, duration and speed ofhis actions. The
concept refers to one's basic capacity for psychological
functioning. Psychological tension refers to the capacity to use
one's psychic energy. The higher one's mental level, i.e., the
more operations one can synthesize, the higher one's psy-
chological tension. (Obviously, Janet's "tension" has no
similarity of meaning to our everyday use of this term.) The
fact that patients differ in regard to their available sources of
psychological force and psychological tension has impor-
tant treatment implications (cf.Janet, 1919/25; Ellenberger,
1970; Van der Hart, Brown, & Braun, 1989).
Janet's original theoretical model of the mind put forth
in his first book, L 'Automatisme Psychologique, denoted only
two levels ofmental functions for which one's psychic energy
was used, that of synthesis and automatic function. As his
work progressed, his experience led him to expand his
conceptual model. He developed the ideas of psychological
force and tension, as well as a hierarchy of mental functions
to five levels, each ofwhich had a coefficient ofreality (Janet,
1903). The highest level of mental activity was the reality
function (fonction du reel). This is the function of reality in
which one grasps the maximal reality of a situation. It
involves the focusing of one's attention on simultaneously
perceiving fully the data ofexternal reali ty ofone's own ideas
and thoughts. The familiar corollary today is "being com-
pletelyin the moment. "This act requires a synthesis ("presen-
tifIcation"): the formation of the present moment in the
mind. "The natural tendency ofthe mind is to roam through
the past and the future; it requires a certain effort to keep
one's attention in the present, and still more to concentrate
it on present action," as Ellenberger (1970, p. 378) re-
marked. Janet said, ''The real present for us is an act of a
certain complexity which we grasp as one single state of
consciousness in spite of this complexity, and in spite of its
real duration, which can be of greater or lesser extent...
PresentifIcation consists of making present a state of mind
and a group of phenomena" (Janet, 1903, I, p. 491).
The five levels ofJanet's hierarchy of mental functions,
which may be used to examine mental health, in descending
order are, 1) the reality function; 2) disinterested activity
(habitual, indifferent and automatic actions); 3) functions
of imagination (abstract reasoning, fantasy, daydreaming,
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and representative memory); 4) emotional reactions; and 5)
useless muscular movements. The first three levels were
considered the superior functions, the last two levels infe-
rior; each set requiring a lesser degree of involvement with
reality in order to be performed.
A "reduction in psychological tension" (or lowering of
the mental level) refers to the lessening ofone's ability to use
one's psychic energy at a high level of perceptive and
integrative functioning. Specifically, it refers to the dimin-
ished two-fold ability of the individual to 1) perceive fully the
details of current reality, coupled with the self-awareness of
one's feelings and ideas in that moment, and 2) to act on this
reality with intentional imminent behavior. Instead of en-
gaging with reality in a maximally integrative way, people
with psychasthenic depression substitute inferior mental
operations in the forms of doubts, agitations, anxieties, and
obsessional ideas. The dominance ofeach of type oflowered
operational function in response to reality characterizes a
different type of disorder, or in Shapiro's terminology,
neurotic style (Shapiro, 1965). As noted previously, in hys-
teria the reduction of psychological tension is characterized
by the narrowing of the field of consciousness and an
increased tendency to dissociation, and by the emancipation
of systems of ideas and functions which when integrated
constitute the personality (Janet, 1909, p. 345).
In the final chapter of Les Neuroses, Janet attempted to
give a general definition of the neuroses. He saw them as
illnesses affecting the various functions of the organism,
mainly by an impairment of the superior parts of these
functions. The higher the functions are arrested in their
evolution, in their adaptation to the present moment, to the
present state of the outside world and present intrapsychic
state of the individual. At the same time there is no deterio-
ration of the inferior parts of these functions. In short,
neuroses are disorders of the various functions of the organ-
ism marked by arrested development of the function with-
out a deterioration of the function itself (p. 392).
L'Etat Mental des Hysteriques. Second enlarged edition
In 1911 an enlarged edi tion of The Mental State ofHysteri-
calswas published. "The Mental Stigmata" and ''The Mental
Accidents" comprised the first part, the second consisted of
various articles which were published between 1898 and
1910. One interesting paper dealt with the analysis and
treatment of his patient Marcelline, whom Janet saw as a
prototype of double personality (Janet, 191Ob). A most
important paper was "Amnesia and Dissociation of Memo-
ries by Emotion" (L'Amnesie et la dissociation des souvenirs
par l' emotion) presenting the case ofIrene (Janet, 1904), to
whichJanet referred often in his later work (d.Janet, 1919/
25,1928 a&b, 1925b).
Irene was a 20-year-old woman who took care of her ter-
minally ill mother, whose death she experienced as very trau-
matic. Soon afterwards she became amnestic for the event of
her mother's demise as well as the three months preceding
it. She was unable to work, developed severe abulia, and lost
all interest in those around her. She was frequently affected
by delirious crises in which she very dramatically reexperi-
enced the critical scenes of her mother's last hours and
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death. Irene was "attached" to the traumatic event in a way
that she could not get beyond. She was unable to adapt to a
life without her mother; her behavior resulted from "nonre-
alization" as Janet (1935b) called it.
Janet's difficult but successful treatment approach
consisted of helping Irene restore her memories, first in
hypnosis and then in the waking state. She had to translate
her traumatic memories into a narrative, a personal account
of the event and how it affected her personality. When she
succeeded in this and showed that she actually realized her
mother's death and could relate her personal account of this·
event, Janet noted that her other symptoms, like profound
abulia, disappeared. Her mental level of functioning in-
creased, and she became capable of adaptive actions again.
The third part of this book consisted of "the most
beautiful and the most original systematic study written on
the treatment of hysteria at the end of the last centery"
(Faure, 1983). In this section, Psychological Treatment ofHys-
teria Ganet, 1898b), Janet emphasized the use of five hyp-
notic techniques: 1) extended hypnosis; 2) utilizing the
temporary absence of symptoms during hypnosis (e.g., let-
ting anorectic patients eat and drink); 3) giving symptom-
oriented suggestions; 4) identifYing fixed ideas; and 5)
treating fixed ideas. The latter two are Janet's most signifi-
cant and original techniques (d. Van der Hart, Brown &
Braun, 1989).
Janet discovered that for certain patients, the act of
telling their fixed ideas (both in the hypnotic and waking
states), functioned as a successful "confession," permitting
them to terminate their attachement to the fixed idea. He
further observed that this was often insufficient for more
severely disturbed patients to detach from their fixed ideas.
With them, he tried to break down the fixed idea's entire
system of images, feeling, and actions gradually, systemati-
cally substituting emotionally neutral or positive content for
the traumatic phenomena.
Janet considered the dissolution offixed ideas indispen-
sable to the cure, but by itself, often insufficient. In his first
writings he indicated that special attention was needed to aid
patients in attaining higher levels of personality organiza-
tions, i.e., increased psychological tension. If they remained
at a low level, new emotions could be overwhelming, easily
giving rise to new fixed ideas and dissociation. Janet de-
scribed many hypnotic and non-hypnotic techniques aimed
at raising a patient's mental level. He also concluded that
hysterical patients usually needed long-term treatment to
address the complexity of returning them to an adequate
level of functioning.
His treatment sessions often entailed having the patient
perform everyday life tasks that required graduated amounts
of the activity ofsyn thesis. This migh t range from painting or
listening to music to translating poetry and sculpting: in
essence, art and occupational therapy. At the same time,
Janet often advocated a simplification of the patient's home
life and interpersonal functioning: stress reduction. His
formulae, concrete suggestions and rationale for adding
energy and decreasing the patient's energy expenditure,
further developed in us Medications Psychologiques, are the
bedrock of a comprehensive treatment approach to the
massively traumatized or severely dissociated patient (d.
Van der Hart, Brown, & Braun, 1989).
Les Medications Psychologiques
The final work in this review is Les Medications
Psychologiques Ganet, 1919). PsychologicalHealing Ganet, 1925),
as the English version is entitled, had a special place in
Janet's work. The two-volume, 1265 page, English edition
presents an extraordinarily interesting history of psycho-
therapy, emphasizing the role of hypnosis and presenting a
marvelous survey ofJanet's multidimensional treatment ap-
proaches. It is here that we find the practical relevance of his
concepts of psychological force and tension in designing in-
dividualized treatment strategies.
With regard to dissociation, Janet proffers a very valu-
able chapter on the study and treatment of traumatic
memories (in which he is rather critical of Freudian no-
tions). Janet summarizes his approach to this matter thus:
"Strictly speaking, then, one who retains a fixed idea of a
happening cannot be said to have a 'memory' of the happen-
ing. It is only for convenience that we speak of it as a
'traumatic memory.' The subject is often incapable ofmaking,
with regard to the event, the recital which we speak of as
memory; and yet he remains confronted by a difficult situ-
ation in which he has not been able to playa satisfactory part,
one to which his adaptation had been imperfect, so that he
continues to make efforts at adaptation. The repetition of
this situation, these continual efforts, give rise to fatigue,
produce an exhaustion which is considerable factor in his
emotions" Ganet, 1925, p. 663).
Psychological Healing is an important source of inspira-
tion and information for the study and treatment of a wide
variety of mental disturbances, especially the dissociative
and posttratumatic stress disorders.
DISCUSSION
It has been Janet's great, though much-neglected con-
tribution to psychiatry that he formulated the dynamic
principles constituting a theory of dissociation: 1) The
nature of the structural elements and functions that com-
prise personality; 2) The nature of the perception of reality
and its disturbance in hysteria by the narrowing of the field
of consciousness; 3) The nature of conscious activity, espe-
cially partial automatism in which a part ofone's personality
is split off from self-awareness and follows an autonomous
subconscious development; 4) The hierarchical classifica-
tion of the capacity to use psychic energy; and 5) The clear
and detailed cases which demonstrate so comprehensively
his concepts and treatment strategies for dissociative phe-
nomena in a broad rage of disorders.
Modern clinicians have greatly furthered our under-
standing of the role of dissociation in the development of
severe dissociative disorders as defined in the DSM-III-R
(American Psychiatric Association, 1987) such as multiple
personality disorder (MPD) (cf. Kluft, 1985; Bliss, 1986;
Braun, 1986; Putnam, 1988). This understanding has led to
important advances in the treatment of patients with thes~
pathologies. It remains apparent, however, that dissociation
13
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is also characteristic of a substantial group of mental disor-
ders in which it is still largely unrecognized or confused with
other psychological phenomena.
It is the legacy ofPierreJanet that he has left us only the
body of his work. He had no disciples, founded no school or
group, did no proselytizing. And yet, 'Janet's work can be
compared to a vast city buried beneath ashes, like Pompeii.
... It may remain buried forever. It may remain concealed
while being plundered by marauders. But it may also per-
haps be unearthed some day and brought back to life"
(Ellenberger, 1970, p. 409). For those whose special inter-
ests lie in dissociation, the rewards may be well worth the dig.
Note: This paper was written when Dr. van der Hart was affiliated
with theDepartment ofPsychiatry, Free University, Amsterdam. The
authors wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments ofDrs. Paul
Brown, Rutger Horst, and Richard Kluft.
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